Moral Neuroscience

"As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation," observed British philosopher and economist Adam Smith in the first chapter of his magisterial The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). "Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator." Smith's argument is that our ability to empathize with others is at the root of our morality.

Recent discoveries in neuroscience are bolstering Smith's insights about the crucial role of empathy in human sociality and morality. For example, in the 1990s, Italian scientists researching motor neurons in macaque monkeys discovered mirror neurons. As the story goes, a monkey's brain had been wired up to detect the firing of his neurons when planning and carrying out a movement such as grasping a peanut. One researcher returned from lunch licking an ice cream cone. As the monkey watched the researcher, some of his neurons fired as though he were eating the ice cream, even though he was not moving. The monkey's neurons were "mirroring" the activity that the monkey was observing.

That is from Reason Magazine's article on moral neuroscience. It highlights some interesting studies performed by recent neuroscientists and psychologists on one of my favorite topics in the field, morality and altruism. All the evidence put out by these scientists only corroborate Smith's initial hypotheses, proving again just how brilliant he was (for those of you who haven't read The Wealth of Nations, please do).

Indeed, human empathy is one of the major characteristics that distinguish us. We have the ability, now scientifically proven through the firing of 'mirror neurons,' to feel the way our fellows do. But what is most interesting about this article is the extent to which this morality applies, i.e. the conclusions on the limits of human altruism.

Case in point, Harvard psychologist Joshua Greene offers the scenario testing altruism:

Harvard University psychologist Joshua Greene offers the case in which, while driving, you see a bleeding hiker lying by the roadside. You must decide between taking the man to the hospital or refuse to do so because the injured man would bleed all over your expensive upholstery.

Greene correctly observes, "Most people say that it would be seriously wrong to abandon this man out of concern for one's car seats" But what about the case in which you receive a letter from an international charity that promises to lift a poor family in Africa out of abject misery at the cost of a $200 contribution from you? "Most people say that it would not be wrong to refrain from making a donation in this case," writes Greene. What's the difference? In both cases, you can help meet the desperate medical needs of someone else at relatively modest cost to yourself.

Greene conducted fMRI brain scans on people while they considered these personal versus impersonal moral dilemmas. He discovered the first "involved greater activity in brain areas that are associated with emotion and social cognition." Why? Greene proposes an evolutionary answer. He points out that our ancestors evolved in an environment in which they could only choose to save people that they knew personally, not total strangers living continents away.

Greene highlight's Smiths initial insights very well, suggesting that human beings have an evolutionary imperative to help and protect those that are proximate to them (family, friends, even the stranger bleeding on the road) so long as it is not costly to them. We have the same evolutionary incentive NOT to help those that are miles away. If everyone cared indiscriminately about every individual in the entire world, nothing on Earth would get accomplished.

It is a very interesting article. I suggest you all read it.