Via the Economist's Free Exchange blog, we have Steve Waldman, who is upset about the Geithner plan's ability to circumvent congressional approval. Here is Mr. Waldman:
First of all, I'm curious as to why Waldman chose to put "private investors" in quotes in the first sentence. Is the implication here that they are not really private investors, which would be a ridiculous claim, or that the $35 billion that the private sector is kicking in for the bailout plan isn't enough, which would be equally ridiculous. I assume the latter is what Waldman is implying here, to which my reply is that I think any larger of a ratio would act as a disincentive for investors to buy up these assets at all, which would ruin the plan before it even started.In my view, the Geithner's PPIP includes two mechanisms intended to ensure that "private investors" offer substantially inflated bids for "legacy" assets, and the net cost of the plan will be comparable to that of TARP. I might be wrong about that, but I might be right. Much of the risk will be due to loan guarantees offered by the FDIC. Is there any legal basis for using the FDIC this way? Aren't the laws describing how the FDIC is and is not supposed to behave?
And isn't Congress supposed to have the power of the purse? A loan guarantee is a contingent liability, a cost in real terms. Can the US Treasury spend money without Congressional approval, as long as it promises to spend only if a coin flip comes up heads? That's exactly what the Geithner plan (along with the scandalous but already active "Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program" program) does. Is that even Constitutional?...
It seems to me that committing hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars should still be considered a serious business. It seems to me that if Congress wouldn't approve the Geithner plan, in a democracy, that ought to have some meaning, and not just get written off as populist outrage and then extralegally ignored.
So I'll ask again, who passed the Geithner plan? What deliberative assembly gave the plan a pass? What's that you say? The stock market went up by nearly 500 points when it was announced on Monday? Oh. I guess the buys have it, then.
On to the main point about Congressional approval. Many folks have been throwing around the term "giveaway," which is understandeable, but there is a considerable difference between offering subsidies directly and offering them in the form of no-recourse loans, which is what's going on here. It is true that this could backfire if most of these assets turn out to be bad, in which case the loans would be forgiven and the government would lose lots of money. On the other hand, if these assets turn out to be good and rise in value, the investors profit, the government gets paid back with interest. This would be good.
Of course, Waldman's concern stems from the uncertainty. There has been considerable outcry from the left and right regarding the effectiveness of the Geithner bailout plan and it seems that the consensus (at least among mainstream pundistry) is that the plan will fail. See Paul Krugman, whose opposition is loud, proud and almost irritating (if not for the fact that the man has attained almost 'do-no-wrong status' in my eyes). So then why commit all of this money to a plan that may or may not work, at best? The reason is because we have to. First, let's recap why the plan is necessary (Congressional approval or not0. I have stated earlier that I think the Geithner plan is a necessary step, politically, in that considering the alternatives (nationalization or the original Paulson plan), it is the easiest to kick-start without causing massive social (and market) upheaval. See Mark Thoma and Brad Delong for more on this. In fact, let's throw in a quote from Thoma, just to drive the point home:
So I do not take a binary (or, I suppose, trinary), either/or approach to the proposals where I think one plan will work and the others will fail miserably. All three plans have their pluses and minuses. The politics of the Paulson plan make it a non-starter, I have no quarrel with the view that it constitutes a giveaway that is not justified, so the only way the Paulson plan will work is if we can convince people that equity stakes or some other mechanism makes the plan sufficiently equitable. I prefer nationalization because it provides a certainty in terms of what will happen that the other plans do not provide, the Geithner plan in particular, but it also appears to suffer from the political handicap of appearing (to some) to be "socialist," and there are arguments that the Geithner plan provides better economic incentives than nationalization (though not everyone agrees with this assertion).More to the point now, what about Congressional approval? Mustn't the appropriation of all these funds for an iffy plan require a democratic approval process? Well, this is a tricky issue. One that Matt Yglesias actually wrote about several days ago, complaining that the no one addressed the topic. Here's Matt:
One aspect of the Geithner plan that I think people aren’t focusing enough attention on is that unlike the other main alternative approaches, it can be executed without further congressional approval. The reason is that there are federal agencies with a standing authority to make loans. And though the plan does have a potentially giveaway structure, technically what’s being offered aren’t subsidies but no recourse loans. Or to put it another way, the subsidies are in the form of no recourse loans rather than direct appropriations, so the government has the authority to move forward under existing TARP legislation and other laws. That, I think, clearly explains the somewhat byzantine structure of the plan’s operations and is also, if you’re sitting in the West Wing, a considerable advantage over a nationalization plan that would require large additional appropriations to cover the debts of nationalized institutions.There is the legal side. Of course, as Yglesias notes later, this can be considered much too technical, and almost a cheap way of getting around legislation. However, I would like to argue that given the current economic and political climate, it is necessary to pass this as quickly as possible. As Krugman notes, "Every month that we fail to come to grips with the economic crisis another 600,000 jobs are lost." Is this enough of a reason to warrant such actions by the Obama administration? One can at least argue the case.
Furthermore, and let me just say that the following is not an argument to side-step Congressional approval, but consider the historical use of "presidential prerogative," a term that should be prevalent by now; in the midst of impending crisis, the executive takes measures that often bypass boundaries set forth by the Constitution. Lincoln did it, Roosevelt did it, Bush did it (though the latter isn't the greatest example). Again, it is of course arguable whether such prerogatives are both a) applicable now, and b) whether they are merited at all, ever. Something to think about, though.